

1 1 2

**KAPOK**  
**SECRET**

OG 11-5903

1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1

9 SEP 1954

ATTN

**E**

**3**

Chief, SE

OBIGEM  
Friday Operations  
REFERENCE: SG-11239, 12 August 1954

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

1. The potential of one Friday mission and the successful recruitment of ALPIGENI definitely warrants further development of this operation.

2. The main consideration at Headquarters on developments to date concerns the action taken by the Sigurimi with regard to ALPIGENI as described in paragraph 6 of the referenced dispatch. The fact that ALPIGENI has been called by the Sigurimi four times and told not to communicate with other members of his family places certain security hazards and obstacles on any mission in which he may participate. His extreme caution and the limitations he has put on any activity he may undertake is understandable and possibly the only course of action feasible at this time.

3. Until the full significance of this Sigurimi development and until the extent of the limitations placed on communication between ALPIGENI and his brothers are determined, no pressure should be put on the principal agent by RDCM R to speed up the recruitment of sub-agents in Durres and Tirana. Under the circumstances ALPIGENI's refusal to send his wife to Tirana before the end of the harvesting season appears to be justified.

4. If ALPIGENI's brothers are eventually recruited in Durres and Tirana, it would appear advisable to wait until the communication restrictions are eased by the Sigurimi before these sources are exploited to any great extent. Until this occurs, we should be satisfied with any information we can get from them by infrequent trips taken by members of the family in visiting one another.

5. One important task these sub-agents could perform, without employing radio and by which would not be greatly handicapped because of poor communication, is signal spotting. If the sub-agent had the ability and desire of spotting, a signal which will might be susceptible to a photograph, and taking a photograph, a copy of the photograph could be run off for our purposes.

for centralized

**SECRET**

**KAPOK**

KAPOK

AD 0-3983  
X KOK-440  
Page 2

SECRET

of recognizing this candidate. Compromisation could thus be minimized. Sub-agents who could perform this function in Barros and Tifern would be a valuable asset even though it might be some time before a communications system could be set up where intelligence reports could be received with some regularity.

5. With regard to issuing ALPIEGON a wrist watch, it is believed here that due to the Sigurini interest in him he should not carry any compromising materials on his person since he could be picked up for questioning and possibly searched at any time. If the watch is an operational necessity, ALPIEGON could conceal it near or in his house when it is not being used operationally. It would also be advantageous to have an alternate dead-drop established as soon as possible, in view of the point raised in paragraph 3 c. of the referenced dispatch, as well as a personal recognition signal which could be used, and which would be acceptable to ALPIEGON if an attempt to contact him is made by someone other than RHOELL R or ALPIEGON. With regard to the alternate dead-drop, a signal which is readily accessible to ALPIEGON during the winter months should be provided for. In this way he could be alerted that the dead-drop had been serviced without having to check at the dead-drop itself.

6. In order to complete our files at Headquarters it would be appreciated if field would forward the names and any additional biographical information RHOELL R may be able to supply on ALPIEGON's wife and on his sister who may act as an unwitting courier. It would also be helpful if RHOELL R could provide the dates when ALPIEGON was called by the Sigurini and any information on whether other members of the family have been approached or warned by the Sigurini.

7. In reviewing the past system of compensation given to agents and in considering the emphasis on the recruitment of resident agents and mounting missions of short duration, the payment of only \$50 a month (less than \$2 per day) to an agent while on a mission does not appear to offer much incentive. It might be appropriate for field to re-examine the agent payment structure, and, if field wishes to make any recommendation on this matter, it will be welcomed and seriously considered at Headquarters. As it stands now, there is very little difference in the amount of money paid to agent standbys and to members of Priority Team who have already gone on two missions this year.

8. All in all, Headquarters feels that recent developments of the Friday mission have been favorable and are encouraging even though the security measures ALPIEGON will operate under have been increased as a result of Sigurini interest in him and the failure of RHOELL R to follow instructions he might have given him.

3 September 1954

SE/CFI

C      L/C/SE  
Releasing officer

SECRET

2-SE-1

KAPOK

✓ SB-1/mk

Distribution

3-Athens

1-RI 1-SE/EX/DR (Dumm)

Authenticating officer

SE-1